In March 2026, only 1 percent of Tisza Party supporters believe that if Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into war. The foundation’s research model, developed earlier in collaboration with Mérték Media Analysis Workshop and Závecz Research, examines the extent to which the masses can be manipulated through the deployment of a propaganda arsenal. The metric created using this methodology, the Political Propaganda Indicator, measures the extent to which voters are persuaded to accept statements that are distorted for political purposes, baseless, exaggerated to maintain power, or openly false—because they have been repeatedly refuted in public or are implausible. According to an analysis conducted by Medián in the second half of March on a representative sample of 1,000 people, a large majority of voters  —  often more than 95 percent  —  had encountered the statements included in the study. We asked the respondents whether they had encountered the statement and, if so, whether they considered it to be true.

Exactly four years ago, a study conducted using the same method found that 30 percent of opposition voters believed a statement — taken out of context and then widely disseminated in government-aligned media — claiming that Péter Márki-Zay would lead Hungary into war. As one explanation for this shocking result, we naturally assumed —beyond the government’s media dominance — that the Hungarian media landscape is marked by striking asymmetry, in which rebuttals largely failed to reach a significant portion of voters. 

Within a democratic framework, the source of political legitimacy is the distribution of votes, which reflects the will of the voters. This is the will of the people. The Political Propaganda Indicator measures the extent to which the media apparatus, directly and indirectly controlled by the government, has diverted the views of ordinary voters on critical issues from the opinions they would spontaneously form based on unbiased, multifaceted, and objective information. The Political Propaganda Indicator reveals whether the members of a given country or community can still freely decide their own fate during an election, or whether the disinformation machine is already so effective—that is, whether it is so difficult to access information free from manipulation—that the freedom of the election may be called into question in certain cases. This is why the Fundamental Law of Hungary, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the United Nations Charter consider the right of voters to access information free from manipulation to be a fundamental right. 

In 2022, our measurements cast doubt on whether this fundamental right is upheld in Hungary. 

What is the situation in the spring of 2026? At the same time as the publication of our research findings, an article by the renowned American historian and journalist Anne Applebaum appeared in The Atlantic, with the subtitle “Orbán’s threats no longer work.”  The article’s title is even more telling: “The First Post-Truth Political Campaign.” The author points out that ahead of the April 12 election, Orbán and Fidesz are no longer talking about real problems but are instead building their campaign on an artificially created, false threat: the “Ukrainian threat.” The article also details Fidesz’s recurring themes that have little to do with reality. In fact, there is no wave of migration that threatens the survival of the Hungarian nation. Brussels poses no real threat to the health and well-being of Hungarians, whereas the state of the country’s hospitals certainly does. And of course, Ukraine isn’t going to invade Hungary — Russia, on the other hand, certainly could — Applebaum argues.

It is worth recalling how Viktor Orbán, then still in the opposition, viewed the propaganda campaign nearly twenty years ago. “Let’s eliminate political advertising from election campaigns, which in Hungary functions not as information but as a manipulative tool designed to mislead people. For example, they are going to spend several billion forints right now to manipulate people.  It’s simple brainwashing, which is their stated goal, and they’re going to do it with our tax money,” said Viktor Orbán on July 24, 2007, on M1. In contrast, since 2011, the government has spent 119 billion forints on national consultations — as revealed by 24.hu in February 2026 after compiling data requests. Between May 2022 and September 2025, 225 billion forints were allocated to government communications, which more than 130 different government agencies spent essentially on political propaganda. The Prime Minister’s Office took the largest slice of the pie with 131.6 billion. 

Yet in 2026, the campaign is essentially ineffective — at least among opposition voters.

 It would require a separate, deeper investigation to determine whether such spending was really necessary to maintain the camp, because the economic situation and the quality of governance would have otherwise discouraged many people from Fidesz-KDNP.  This study also contains data that supports this assumption, whether regarding the pedophile scandal or the credibility of explanations for inflation. We asked about the credibility of statements explaining the rate of inflation and about government claims refuting the possibility of underage victims in the pedophile scandal.  

The Statements 

The statements formulated during the survey represent perhaps the most prominent messages of the campaign. Respondents were asked to answer two questions. Had they encountered the statement? Did they consider the statement to be true?

1.    Fidesz is pro-peace.

2.    Tisza is pro-war.

3.    Brussels is pro-war.

4.    Fidesz will ensure we stay out of the war.

5.    War is the real cause of high inflation.

6.    Poor governance was the real cause of high inflation.

7.    Ukraine supports the Tisza Party.

8.    Tisza would eliminate the 14th-month pension.

9.    The Tisza Party brings EU funding home from Brussels.

10.    Péter Magyar is a puppet of Brussels.

11.    The Tisza Party will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

12.    Brussels is giving Hungarians’ money to the Ukrainians.

13.    There were no underage victims in the pedophile scandal.

14.    Anyone who doesn’t support Tisza is helping Fidesz.

15.    There is no economic growth because of the war.

16.    If Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into the war.

We conducted a similar survey in mid-March 2025. The survey was conducted by Závecz Research via in-person interviews with a sample of 1,000 people between March 16 and 24, 2025. We asked the same questions we had asked in 2024 before the election, in order to have a basis for comparison. And, of course, we also formulated new questions. 

1.    The left is pro-war, the government is pro-peace

2.    Left-wing politicians serve foreign interests for money: “They’ve been bought off by the kilo”

3.    Péter Magyar is a puppet of Brussels politicians aiming to topple the Orbán government

4.       The Pride parade threatens children’s healthy sexual development

5.    Foreigners are trying to topple the Hungarian government with funding from abroad

6.    The work of civil society organizations and media outlets supported from abroad makes public discourse and public life more balanced. 

7.       The European Union is pro-war, while U.S. President Donald Trump is pro-peace

8.    The government’s dominance in the media decisively influences the election

9.    The Hungarian government has successfully defeated inflation

10.    Due to the Hungarian government’s measures, Hungary had the highest inflation rate in the EU in 2024

11.    The EU is punishing Hungary by freezing funds due to the Hungarian government’s pro-peace policy

12.    The EU is punishing Hungary by freezing funds due to restrictions on the rule of law

13.    Parliament extended emergency governance due to the war raging in a neighboring country

14.    Fidesz extended emergency rule to bypass parliamentary oversight

In the spring of 2024, 23 percent of leftists and democrats agreed with the statement that the left is pro-war and the government is pro-peace. In the spring of 2025, only 9 percent of opposition supporters—most of whom were already Tisza supporters at that time—agreed with the accusation, hammered home by Fidesz, that the left was pro-war. In 2026, only 1 percent of Tisza supporters say that if Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into war. In contrast, 81 percent of Fidesz-KDNP supporters believe the claim to be true. The most important lesson from the 2026 survey is the national divide in public opinion. Citizens hold diametrically opposed views on the same issue, depending on which camp they belong to. 

Key Findings of the Study 

1.    The government has no message capable of swaying opposition supporters away from their own group.

2.    Government propaganda is virtually ineffective among the opposition. The “Mi Hazánk” movement may be the exception.

3.    The government’s propaganda campaign remains effective among Fidesz-KDNP supporters. 

4.    Fidesz-KDNP supporters still widely believe unverifiable claims to be true.

5.    When broken down by age group, there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of the propaganda.

6.    When broken down by educational attainment, the difference in how the propaganda is received is also not particularly significant between the groups.

7.    Among the general population, 11% of those under 40 believe that if Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into war.

8.    Less than one-third of those under 60 believe that if Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into war.

9.    Even among voters over 60, less than half believe that if Tisza wins, Hungary will be dragged into war.

10.    In other words, 45 percent believe this repeatedly debunked and nonsensical claim. (This figure is easy to calculate if we know that Fidesz-KDNP supporters believe it, while Tisza supporters do not.) 

11.    Among the total population, 4 percent of those under 40 believe it to be true that there were no underage victims in the pedophile scandal 

12.   Among the total population, 10 percent of those under 60 and 14 percent of those over 60 believe that there were no underage victims in the pedophile scandal. 

13.    One-third of those under 40 in the total population believe that Fidesz is pro-peace. 

14.   Thirteen percent of those under 40 believe that Tisza is pro-war.

15.    Forty-eight percent of those over 60 believe that Tisza is pro-war. 

16.    Eighty percent of young people believe that poor governance was the cause of high inflation.

17.    There is no generational difference in the assessment of the statement that those who do not support Tisza are helping Fidesz. A consistent 61 percent agree with this among those aged 60 and older and those under 40. Among older adults, an even higher proportion—70 percent—hold this view. 

18.   The statement that Brussels is giving Hungarians’ money to Ukrainians is considered true by 14% of those under 40, 36% of those between 40 and 60, and 48% of those over 60. 

19.   There is a much smaller difference in the assessment of individual statements when grouped by educational attainment compared to generational differences. 49% of those with at most an 8th-grade education agree with the statement: “If Tisza wins, they will drag Hungary into war.” 39% of those with vocational training, 25% of high school graduates, and 17% of those with a college degree agree with the statement.

20.    The following percentages — 12% among those with up to eight years of schooling, 16% among skilled workers, 7% among high school graduates, and 7% among those with a college degree—agree that there were no underage victims in the pedophile scandal. 

21.    39% of those with up to 8 years of schooling believe that the war was the cause of high inflation. 33% of skilled workers, 26% of high school graduates, and 23% of those with a college degree agree with the statement. 

22.   98% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters believe that Fidesz is a peace party. Only 15% of Tisza Party supporters share this view.

23.    86% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters believe that the Tisza Party is pro-war. Only 1% of Tisza Party supporters believe this. 

24.    Brussels is giving Hungarians’ money to Ukrainians; 78% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters believe this to be true. Only 5 percent of Tisza supporters consider the statement credible. 

25.    Péter Magyar is a puppet of Brussels — 90 percent of Fidesz-KDNP supporters accept the statement as true, while 2 percent of Tisza Party supporters, for some reason, thought it might be true. 

26.   The political communication surrounding the pedophile scandal was unsuccessful. Twenty percent of Fidesz-KDNP supporters believed that there were no underage victims in the scandal, while only 4 percent of Tisza Party supporters accepted the government’s claim. 

Notes

One cannot discuss the transformation of the Hungarian information system without addressing Péter Magyar’s personal role. From the very beginning, he recognized that he was at war with the public service media — which he called a “propaganda factory” — and the media empire kept on the breasts of state. He declared war on the powers that be and knew that one of the most important tools for maintaining power is control over the media landscape, which he circumvented by leveraging the potential of social media, organizing in-person meetings, and traveling the country.

The changes in the technical tools of persuasion are revolutionary. Artificial intelligence is presenting the field of political communication with new challenges. The use of social media has reached new heights in recent years. The government reacted belatedly and misunderstood the essence of the matter, because through these new tools, an untraceable multitude of autonomous actors unleashed a flood of free opinions upon the public, while the government controlled the central organization of digital civic circles from the center, and even its large-scale anti-war rallies in the analog world were unable to counterbalance the ecosystem of independent opinions. In fact. 

It bears repeating: “It cannot be emphasized enough that journalists in the independent media have carried out their work over the past 16 years consistently, without compromise, and at great personal risk—without which there would be no chance of a regime change today. It is precisely Hungarian journalists who are proof that the rabble-rousers on social media are by no means replacing the professional media. Democracy requires free journalism and a free media, not merely free shouting.” (Gábor Polyák FB, March 25, 2026)

Incidentally, the structure of Hungarian society became distorted to an unprecedented degree between 2021 and 2025, according to the evaluation of a survey conducted in the fall of 2025 by the Institute of Sociology at the ELTE Research Center for Social Sciences. Between 2021 and 2025, the proportion of the upper class nearly halved, dropping from 9% to 5%. Similarly, the proportion of the upper middle class fell dramatically from 24% to 14%, while that of the lower middle class rose from 36% to 38%. The most dramatic change occurred in the proportion of the lower class, which rose from 31 percent to 43 percent—an unprecedented increase. “We couldn’t believe our eyes that the proportion of the lower class, which had been one-third, rose to 43 percent in four years,” said Imre Kovách during the presentation of the study.

Regarding the scientific background of brainwashing, Robert Jay Lifton writes that the result of this technique is that the worldview and mindset formed as a result prevent the individual from having thoughts that contradict the group’s or leader’s doctrines, or even from having doubts. How does this work? Critical thoughts are labeled as sinful, dangerous, or wrong. The individual learns to immediately “stop” (suppress, dismiss) these doubts, often by repeating clichés, chanting, or meditating. The goal: to simplify thinking, eliminate complexity, and ensure that faith in the doctrine remains unquestionable. Those who have been brainwashed are thus trapped in a bubble with no chance of escape. Information free from manipulation likely never reaches them. But those who managed to avoid falling victim to brainwashing, or whose existential circumstances opened their eyes, can learn the truth.

It’s worth taking the time to explore the rows of the tables; there are countless insights in the research that I couldn’t highlight in this article due to lack of space and time.

I wish you all the best in your discoveries!

Think it's true ….